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What are the long-term effects of Communism on economically relevant notions such as 
social trust? To answer this question, we use the reunification of Germany as a natural 
experiment and study the post-reunification trajectory of convergence with regard to 
individuals’ trust and risk, as well as perceived fairness and cooperativeness. Our hypotheses 
are derived from a model of German reunification that incorporates individual responses both 
to incentives and to values inherited from earlier generations as recently suggested in the 
literature. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, we find that despite twenty 
years of reunification East Germans are still characterized by a persistent level of social 
distrust. In comparison to West Germans, they are also less inclined to see others as fair or 
helpful. Implied trajectories can be interpreted as evidence for the passing of cultural traits 
across generations and for cooperation being sustained by values rather than by reputation. 
Moreover, East Germans are found to be more risk loving than West Germans. In contrast to 
trust and fairness, full convergence in risk attitude is reached in recent years. 
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Twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet system, there is growing interest in the long-
lasting e⁄ects Communism had and still has on economically relevant notions. Following
a recently established strand of mostly empirical literature (Alesina and Fuchs-Sch￿ndeln
2007, Buch and Toubal 2009, Burda 2006, Fuchs-Sch￿ndeln and Izem 2008, Redding and
Sturm 2008, S￿ssmuth et al. 2010, Uhlig 2006),1 we exploit the division of Germany
after the Second World War and the reuni￿cation of East and West Germany in 1990 as
a source of exogenous variation. Part of the existing literature is focused on individuals￿
policy preferences such as attitudes towards income redistribution or pro-state provision
of services that could as well be provided by private forces (e.g., Alesina and Fuchs-
Sch￿ndeln 2007). In a recent paper, Rainer and Siedler (2009) examine whether the
post-reuni￿cation, democratic experience of East Germans enhances trust which has been
shown to impact on a variety of economic outcomes (Knack and Keefer 1997, Alesina
and La Ferrara 2002, Slemrod and Katuscak 2005). Their ￿ndings suggest that some
ten years after reuni￿cation, East Germans still have the same levels of social distrust as
shortly after the fall of the wall. An even more fundamental notion, as it can be seen as
prerequisite for trust and altruistic cooperation, is fairness. At the individual level, it has
for example been shown that sel￿sh or greedy intentions destroy altruistic cooperation
almost completely, whereas sanctions perceived as fair leave altruism intact (Fehr and
Rockenbach 2003). By now, there however are only a few studies that empirically study
fairness at the societal level (see, e.g., Zak and Fakhar 2005). To our knowledge, none of
them analyzes the notion of fairness in the context of the German reuni￿cation process.
We add to this literature (i) by re-examining the East-West trust gradient, (ii) by
analyzing the e⁄ects on individuals￿risk attitudes and their persistence as well as (iii)
by studying the di⁄erences in the perception of others being fair and helpful and their
persistence over time. Our hypotheses are derived from a model of German reuni￿cation
1While Redding and Sturm (2008) rely on the division of Germany as central source of exoge-
nous variation, we rather follow the other studies in that our focus is on German reuni￿cation
and reintegration.
2that incorporates individual responses both to incentives and to values inherited from
earlier generations as recently suggested by Tabellini (2008b). In contrast to Rainer and
Siedler (2009), who use repeated cross-sectional data, but similar to Alesina and Fuchs-
Sch￿ndeln (2007), we use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, which allows
accounting for intra-personal correlation over time.
Our results indicate that despite almost twenty years of German reuni￿cation, East
Germans show a persistently lower level of social trust, which holds controlling for a
wide range of socio-demographic and contextual characteristics as well as across various
estimation approaches. They also continue to believe less that other people are fair or
helpful. However, the patterns for these outcomes turn out to be somewhat less robust
than our ￿ndings on trust. With regard to testing the model synthesizing incentives and
inherited value systems, these results lend support to the passing of cultural traits across
generations and for cooperation being sustained by values rather than by reputation. In
line with recent evidence (see, e.g., Bonin et al. 2009), we also ￿nd East Germans to be
more risk loving than their West German counterparts which again holds for an ample
range of robustness checks. In contrast to trust and fairness, however, risk attitudes
converge in the ￿two Germanies.￿In sum, while we ￿nd evidence for a persistent social
distrust and scepticism in fairness of East Germans that notably is either not converging
or converges very slowly to the West German level over the last decade, risk attitudes
do converge. However, contrary to common belief the latter path of convergence is a
trajectory from a relatively higher preference for risk among East Germans to the more
risk averse attitude prevalent among West German individuals. We ascribe this ￿nding to
path dependence as the evolution of a general notion of risk aversion at the societal level
requires a democratic experience and system where public deliberation plays a crucial
role in evaluating risk (Laidi 2010).
Inspired by the ￿ndings of Alesina and Fuchs-Sch￿ndeln (2007) and particularly
Rainer and Siedler (2008) that East Germans more likely favor state interventions, we
run additional cross-sectional exercises and examine whether being raised under a highly
rigid communist regime known as the German Democratic Republic (GDR) correlates
3with respondents￿attitudes towards progressive taxes but also with their external locus
of control, i.e. individuals￿beliefs that the actions of external forces are dominant for
their lives￿circumstances as well as with their propensity to reciprocate. The results from
these exercises indicate that (i) East Germans, and particularly so East Germans who
did not move westwards after reuni￿cation, are more in favor of redistribution than their
West German counterparts. (ii) Even 15 years after reuni￿cation, East Germans have a
higher external locus of control than their West German counterparts, which again, is
more prevalent for those Easterners who did not relocate to former West Germany.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an account of the histori-
cal background and summarizes the existing literature. In Section 3 the theoretical model
is outlined. Central testable implications are derived. Empirical evidence is reported and
discussed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Historical background and existing literature
In the aftermath of World War II, a population of 19.1 million lived in the Soviet zone that
o¢ cially became the GDR in 1949. About one sixth of these individuals emigrated into
the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) before the Berlin Wall was built in 1961.2 In the
following decades the Socialist Unity Party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschland ￿
SED) established a repressive one-party communist system that lasted until the peaceful
revolution of 1989 and o¢ cial reuni￿cation in 1990. Con￿ned by the Iron Curtain only
about 600,000 people emigrated from East to West by 1988. This 3.6 million East-West
migrants contrast with just around 30,000 people per year emigrating from West to East
in the 1950s, and almost no West-East migration after 1961.
Since reuni￿cation former GDR residents have experienced life in a market-based
2For sources of migration ￿gures see Alesina and Fuchs-Sch￿ndeln (2007, p. 1510). Another
concise historical background of the division of Germany, highlighting the implied cut through
regions of prewar Germany that had been integrated through several centuries, can be found
in Redding and Sturm (2008, pp. 1770-1771). It also gives an account of the sparse migration
￿ ows between East and West Germany after the division of Germany.
4democracy that FRG residents experienced since 1945. During the division period West
Germany was populated by about 250 inhabitants per square kilometer with a share of
foreign nationals of approximately 6-10 percent. Immigrants to the FRG originated from
a range of countries with diverse cultural backgrounds. The majority of them were guest
workers immigrating from Turkey, followed by former Yugoslavia, Italy, and Greece. In
contrast, the population density in the GDR was roughly 150 inhabitants per square
kilometer with a Slavonic minority of 40-60 thousand Sorbians and a negligible share of
foreign nationals.
About 20-30 percent of the current German population has been born and grown up
in the GDR. These individuals experienced one of the most rigid regimes of the former
communist block. East Germans were governed by a communist regime that severely and
systematically violated the basic rights of its citizens over several decades. Given that
the sparse freedom that people had was further undermined by the GDR￿ s Ministry of
State Security￿ s (Ministerium f￿r Staatssicherheit ￿MfS) secret service Staatssicherheit
alias ￿Stasi,￿one could actually argue that it was the most rigid regime of the former
communist block. Rainer and Siedler (2009, pp. 251-252) quantify the societal in￿ltra-
tion and climate of mistrust in the following way referring to Koehler (1999) as central
source for ￿gures: ￿The Stasi kept ￿les on an estimated six million people, and built
up a network of civilian informants (￿ uno¢ cial collaborators￿ ), who monitored politically
incorrect behavior among other citizens. By 1995, 174,000 East Germans had been iden-
ti￿ed as uno¢ cial collaborators. This amounts to 2.5 percent of the total population
and constitutes one of the highest penetrations of any society by a security apparatus.
In fact, the ratio of ￿ watchers￿to ￿ watched￿was even higher than (i.e. roughly 90-times)
that of the Soviet Union under communism.￿Other sources document an even higher
penetration of society with a total of 600,000 MfS collaborators, implying on average, at
least, one Stasi collaborator in every random sample of 50 citizens (Citizens￿Committee
2010). Several recent documentary and non-documentary movies, one of which lending
its title to the contribution by Alesina and Fuchs-Sch￿ndeln (2007) and one of which win-
ning an Academy￿ s Award in 2007 (The Lives of Others), characterize the suppression of
5citizens by the MfS and the tremendous in￿ltration of society with suspicion and implied
physical as well as mental violence that continued for four decades until the peaceful
self-liberation of GDR citizens in 1989. The activities of Stasi full-time employees, unof-
￿cial personnel, and collaborators included the checking and censorship of personal mail,
phone surveillance, and all sorts of observation and investigation disregarding any basic
civic rights. The GDR system habitually imposed unfair moral choices: for example, de-
nounce your neighbor or colleague, or your child will never go to university. It preached
altruism but ingrained sel￿shness. Obviously, in the words of Tabellini (2008b, p. 909)
there is a history of political abuse and exploitation from which citizens of the former
GDR su⁄ered, possibly echoing to the present day. The central open question therefore
is whether or by how much after two decades, i.e., after one generation having grown up
in a free and law-governed society, restoration of public-spiritedness, decency, and trust
is completed.
Before setting up our model of German reuni￿cation, we will brie￿ y sketch some
hypotheses in the existing literature as they relate to the relationship between political
system and the notions of social trust, risk attitude, and fairness.
2.1 Political system and social trust
In a recent paper, Nunn and Watchekon (2010) document the high persistency of mistrust
among black Africans whose ancestors were heavily raided during the slave trade. To
capture a causal e⁄ect the authors use historic proximity of ancestors to the coast of
the Indian ocean and the Paci￿c ocean to instrument slave trade intensity. They ￿nd
that even 100 years after the end of the slave trade period, the system left its traces in
terms of an eroded level of social trust. Of course, we would not expect such a secular
persistency of mistrust in the aftermath of the GDR system given that the slave trade
period lasted for about four centuries, depriving colored individuals from basically all
human rights, while the repressive surveillance-based system of the GDR existed for four
decades. Therefore, when it comes to comparing West and East German individuals, we
6would rather expect similar or even more pronounced evidence of a gap in social trust
as reported in Tabellini (2008a) who ￿nds that trust of second-generation U.S. citizens
is higher if they came from countries that over a century ago had the better political
institutions. Based on data from repeated cross-sections Rainer and Siedler (2009) ￿nd
some ￿rst indications for this hypothesis to hold for the ￿rst decade after Germany￿ s
reuni￿cation, that is, for the early transition period of East Germany from a communist
regime to a market-based democracy. However, to measure the (inherited) persistency of
mistrust and a potential convergence of trust levels in the post-transition period, the use
of panel data is preferable to relying on cross-sectional data. In the context of passing
values and attitudes over generations, of course, controlling for age will be crucial. Sutter
and Kocher (2007), for example, ￿nd in an experimental trust game setting that trust
and trustworthiness increase more or less linearly with age.
2.2 Political system and risk attitude
Similar to trust that is found to be ￿ if at all￿ poorly explained by the self-interest-
approach (Fehr and Rockenbach 2003), risk aversion at the societal level is not a simple
matter of rationality but rather a matter of identity. To make this point Laidi (2010)
provocatively states that even North Korea weighs the costs and bene￿ts of launching
missile strikes on Japan. But what is it that makes a society risk averse (in a rather wide
sense) going beyond the slogan of a country being a ￿soft power?￿The answer given
by Laidi (2010) is that the evolution of a general notion of risk aversion at the societal
level requires a democratic experience and a system where public deliberation plays a
crucial role in evaluating risk. In analogy to the First Amendment, freedom of opinion
in the FRG is guaranteed in Article 5 of its Basic Law (Grundgesetz), i.e., its post-war
constitutional law that was formally approved on 8 May 1949, and, with the signature
of the Western Allies, came into e⁄ect on 23 May 1949, as the constitution of West Ger-
many. Today the Grundgesetz represents the constitution of reuni￿ed Germany. Article
5 comprises freedom of speech and freedom of press. It explicitly interdicts censorship.
In contrast, the GDR witnessed a constitution that successively eroded the freedom of
7opinion from its ￿rst version of 1949 to its proceeding versions of 1968 and 1974, which
o¢ cially set the state in its Article I under the leadership of its one and only party, the
Marxist-Leninist party (SED). It cleared the way for all sorts of uncritical propaganda.
While the Prague Spring period of political liberalization and the 1968 reform movement
in Czechoslovakia did not show substantial contagious e⁄ects in the GDR, FRG citizens
at the same time witnessed a broad societal protest movement against perceived author-
itarianism and hypocrisy of the German government and other Western governments. In
the following decades and in particular with the birth of the West German Green Party
(Die Gr￿nen) in the early 1980s, e⁄ectively extending the political arena to a four party
competition, external concerns of the public like the threat through medium-range mis-
siles or, in general, the arms race in the course of the cold war were extensively discussed
and a democratic demonstration culture established. These forms of public deliberation
also applied to internal concerns like the danger of nuclear plants accidents or genetically
modi￿ed organisms. In contrast, before the ￿Monday Demonstrations￿of the late 1980s
that initiated the collapse of the GDR comparable debates of internal and external con-
cerns of society existed only in the scattered and merely existent underground but not
in the public sphere.
A perspective that is at ￿rst sight at odds with the above line of argumentation can be
found in a recent and rather macroeconomic strand of literature that is concerned with ￿-
nancial risk taking and the development of respective attitudes. It comes up with another
reasoning regarding the nexus of personal or collective experience and risk attitude. For
example, it suggests that individuals who had an experience of a large macroeconomic
shock like the Great Depression show a long-lasting e⁄ect on their attitudes towards risk
due to this experience (￿depression babies￿ ). An overview of this literature is given in
Malmendier and Nagel (2009). According to this literature, it is, in particular, personal
￿nancial risk experience that shapes one￿ s preferences towards risk. Given that planned
economies, in general, failed to attenuate macroeconomic shocks and showed similar busi-
ness cycle patterns as market economies (Hillinger 1992), we would expect no substantial
di⁄erence in risk attitude. However, we should keep in mind that macroeconomic shocks
8were experienced quite di⁄erently in the two systems. The GDR￿ s collectivist social plan-
ner￿ s state, for example, virtually guaranteed full employment, making it unnecessary for
citizens to insure against unemployment. In this context, insurance through free capital
market instruments, represented by a vast diversity of stock market vehicles, can be seen
as an experience good or service in the sense of Nelson (1970). Interpreting (￿nancial)
risk aversion in this way, we would also expect former GDR citizens to be characterized
by a relatively lower level of risk aversion compared to West German individuals whose
attitude evolved over decades of repeated (positive) experience with capital market in-
struments in insuring against macroeconomic shocks. This line of reasoning is restricted
to the ￿nancial aspect of risk aversion. It does not apply to a more general notion of risk
attitude.
Using the ￿all reset button￿experiment of German reuni￿cation our study can shed
some light on whether the default level of (the general notion of) risk attitude actually
is the more risk loving or the less risk loving attitude compared to the one prevalent in
an established market economy. This question is regardless of the reuni￿cation process
interesting in itself as we can make the point for either default level. Following the
literature cited above, we can interpret risk aversion as the outcome of a learning process.
Accordingly, the default level is the relatively more risk loving one. An intuitive example
is a toddler playing on the edge of a cli⁄. However, from anthropology we know of
relics from cavemen times like the state of being paralyzed with shock in the case of an
unexpected threat that speak in favor of a relatively more risk averse default level.3
2.3 Political system, fairness and value systems
As argued in Fehr and Rockenbach (2003), fairness is, in fact, prior to trust in that it
represents the deeper of the two notions, implying that social trust might be seen as
the outcome of a (repeated) experience of fairness and cooperativeness. It questions the
3In this particular case, the relic is rooted in our front cerebral lobe. It represents an
evolutionary advantage of the caveman as it was of paramount importance for survivor to stay
with the herd particularly in the case of an unexpected threat (Goleman 1997).
9dominant role and universality of self-interest and the implication that welfare enhanc-
ing cooperation is doomed to fail unless well de￿ned small groups interact inde￿nitely
(G￿chter et al. 2010). See also Fehr and Schmidt (2006) for a recent survey of the related
theoretical literature. Yet there are only a few studies that empirically study fairness at
the societal level (see, e.g., Zak and Fakhar 2005). To our knowledge, none of them
analyzes the notion of fairness in the context of the reuni￿cation of Germany.
A political system, in particular, in its polar form of a collectivist (GDR) or individ-
ualist (FRG) society, shapes through, among others, markets and economic institutions
the cultural and socio-economic background of a society (Greif 1994, Bowles 1998). Fair-
ness as a dominant behavioral force is found to be determined by this type of background
(Guiso et al. 2006, FernÆndez 2007, Tabellini 2008a) which is identi￿ed in the literature
as those sets of beliefs and values that the majority of people in a society hold and that
get ￿transmitted fairly unchanged from generation to generation￿(Guiso et al. 2006, p.
23). Since the ￿evolution of value systems is determined by initial and possibly random
historical circumstances￿(Tabellini 2008b, p. 909) and since the division of Germany in
terms of actual borders implied quite some random element as documented, for example,
in Redding and Sturm (2007), the German reuni￿cation process is a predestined natural
experiment to study in this context.
3 Theoretical model
The following model draws on Tabellini (2008b), and extends it in its static version
(section 3.1) and, in particular, in its dynamic version (section 3.2) to the case of two
societies that evolved for some generations separately and get (re-)uni￿ed (section 3.3).
3.1 Basic comparative static model: Exogenous values
The basic model represents a one-shot matching game, where individuals are randomly
matched with one another. Each individual is located at distance y with probability
10g (y) > 0, where distance not necessarily refers to geography, but also to social or eco-
nomic dimensions such as religion, ethnicity, and class.4
After having been matched, individuals observe their distance and play a prisoner￿ s
dilemma game including material payo⁄s (Figure 1).
C NC
C c;c h ￿ l;c + w
NC c + w;h ￿ l h;h
Figure 1. Prisoner￿ s Dilemma: Material Payo⁄s
As usual, c > h and l;w > 0. We follow Tabellini (2008b, p. 910) assuming that
l ￿ w, namely that the loss from being cheated is at least as large as the bene￿t of
cheating ￿relative to the respective payo⁄s under full cooperation and no cooperation
at all.
Besides these material payo⁄s, each individual receives a non-economic psychological
bene￿t d > max(l;w) whenever playing C, irrespective of the strategy played by the
opponent. In other words, the non-material payo⁄s represent a value of cooperating per
se. We can interpret them as ￿warm glow￿(Andreoni 1990). Bene￿t drawn from this
e⁄ect decays with distance at exponential rate ￿ > 0. Strategy C, therefore, generates
a non-economic bene￿t that amounts to de￿￿y. Thus, parameter ￿ can be interpreted as
the rate at which non-economic bene￿ts decay with distance y, relative to the economic
payo⁄s. This feature of the model captures the idea that norms of good conduct apply
particularly strong within a circle of socially connected individuals (e.g., relatives and
nuclear circle of friends), and less so with less familiar individuals (strangers).
There are two players k = 0;1. Both enjoy the same bene￿t d of cooperating, but
di⁄er in the rate at which the bene￿t decays with distance, ￿1 and ￿0, with ￿0 > ￿1.
Tabellini (2008b) refers to the two types as trustworthy (if k = 1) and not-trustworthy
4We ￿nd a similar idea in the quantitative political economy literature on spatial power
indices, where space refers to ideological space; see, e.g., Barr and Passarelli (2009).
11(if k = 0), because for any positive distance a trustworthy player values cooperation more
than a not-trustworthy player. Individuals observe distance y, but not trustworthiness
of the other party. The fraction of trustworthy (k = 1) types in the population is the
same at any point in a uniformly distributed continuum of one-period lived individuals.
This fraction n is for the moment assumed to be a ￿xed parameter n with 1 > n > 0.
It is endogenized in the dynamic version of the model. In the context of the division of
Germany, we can inversely interpret 1 ￿ n as the number of players who strictly adhere,
irrespective of private spheres and a potential warm glow, to the guidelines of the system
and play NC. In the GDR system this type of behavior corresponds to toeing the party
line of the socialist unity party.
Let ￿(y) denote the probability that the opponent player will choose C, such that the
expected payo⁄ from playing NC rather than C is ￿ (y)w plus, in terms of an avoided
loss, [1 ￿ ￿ (y)]l. Therefore, we can express a player￿ s ￿sucker￿ s payo⁄￿as
T (￿ (y)) = l ￿ ￿ (y)(l ￿ w) > 0: (1)
Given that l ￿ w, function T (￿ (y)) is non-increasing in ￿ (y), the probability that the
opponent will play C, and strictly decreasing in ￿ (y) if l > w. Intuitively, if l > w, the loss
of being cheated is greater than the bene￿t of cheating, implying that the temptation to
cheat is greater if the opponent is also more likely to cheat (i.e., T (￿) is strictly decreasing
in ￿). This feature represents an inherent strategic complementarity of the game. Every
player is weighing this temptation up against the non-economic bene￿t of cooperation,
de￿￿ky, which depends on a player￿ s type. Therefore, indi⁄erence between playing C or







































Holding ￿ constant, e yk de￿nes a threshold, inasmuch individual k prefers to play C in a
match with someone at distance y < e yk, while k prefers to play NC if y > e yk. If l > w,
12the right-hand side of (3) is increasing in ￿ (y). There are multiple equilibria. We follow
Tabellini (2008b) by concentrating only on the Pareto superior equilibrium that sustains
maximal cooperation. Next, consider a not-trustworthy player, k = 0, and suppose that
the opponent is always expected to cooperate, i.e., ￿ (y) = 1. In this case (3) reduces to
Y
0 = (lnd ￿ lnw)=￿
0: (4)
Player k = 0 ￿nds it optimal to cooperate up to distance y ￿ Y 0 and to play NC if
y > Y 0. Up to distance y ￿ Y 0 a trustworthy player also plays C, because a higher
non-economic bene￿t from cooperation is given. For y > Y 0, however, the trustworthy
player realizes that all the not-trustworthy players will play NC. The trustworthy player￿ s
most optimistic expectation is that only trustworthy type opponents cooperate. Being
matched with such an opponent happens with probability n. Inserting ￿ (y) = n in the
right-hand side of (3), we obtain
e y
1 = flnd ￿ ln[(w ￿ l)n + l]g=￿
1: (5)
If e y1 > Y 0, a trustworthy player ￿nds it optimal to cooperate up to e y1, given that all other
trustworthy players are expected to also cooperate; beyond this threshold this type of
player prefers to play NC. If instead e y1 ￿ Y 0, then (given the expectation that everyone
cooperates up to Y 0), such a player also prefers to play C up to Y 0, but not beyond.








Note that Y 1 ￿ Y 0, with strict inequality if n is su¢ ciently large, or if the two types
are su¢ ciently di⁄erent from each other. To see this, consider that Y 1 increases with e y1
irrespective of Y 0 according to (6).
Proposition 1 @Y 1
@n > 0 until Y 1 ￿ Y 0:
Proof. See Appendix A.
So far, we have derived a lower (Y 0) and an upper (Y 1) threshold for cooperativeness,
that is, [Y 0;Y 1] de￿ne the scope of cooperation in nearby or more distant matches. The
13model is driven by an information externality, as good players bear the risk of cooper-
ating against an unreliable opponent due to individuals being unable to observe their
opponent type. The increasing e⁄ect of n on Y 1 re￿ ects the strategic complementarity
in the prisoner￿ s dilemma game. Given l > w, individuals are more willing to cooperate
the higher is the probability that their partner will also cooperate. With regard to a
communist system, this strategic complementarity can be interpreted in the following
way: If a system succeeds in raising the number of individuals 1 ￿ n who are true to its
principles, it simultaneously fosters the collectivistic attitude of people who are already
blindly loyal to the system.
In the context of Germany￿ s division and reuni￿cation, a decreasing cooperativeness
with increasing 1 ￿ n is a central testable implication: The share of not-trustworthy
individuals in a society 1 ￿ n can be exogenously increased by a repressive political
regime as was the case in the GDR due to every day life in￿ltrating activities of Stasi
(secret state￿ s police) collaborators and the hiring and networking of civilian informants.
3.2 Dynamic model: Endogenous values
As noted earlier the idea is to endogenize n by modeling how parents rationally choose
what values to transmit to their children dependent on economic incentives as well as
other features of the environment. Whether a given individual is of type k = 0 or 1 is due
to either ￿nature or nurture,￿where the latter is determined by the external environment
and/or the parental education e⁄ort. Parents are altruistic and care about the utility of
their o⁄spring, but evaluate their kids￿expected welfare with their own preferences. This
assumption of ￿imperfect empathy￿(Tabellini 2008b, p. 916) implies that some parents
devote e⁄ort to try and shape the values of their children to resemble their own.
Consider an in￿nite economy, where agents live two periods. In the ￿rst period, they
get educated by their parents. After completion of education, agents become themselves
players in the game described above. In the second period, each individual is the parent of
a single kid and the parent￿ s only activity is to educate the respective o⁄spring. Parental
14education increases the probability that the kid becomes trustworthy (￿k = ￿1), but is
costly for the parent. Educational e⁄ort f is chosen by each parent before observing
a kid￿ s type of value system. The probability of having a trustworthy kid does not
depend on the parent￿ s type. The impact of ￿nature and nurture￿is denoted by ￿ and
f, respectively. Given e⁄ort f ￿ 0, the kid turns out to be trustworthy (￿k = ￿1) with
probability ￿+f, and unreliable (￿k = ￿0) with probability 1￿(￿ + f), where 1 > ￿ > 0.
Letting V
pk
t denote the parent￿ s p evaluation of the respective kid￿ s overall expected
utility in the equilibrium of the matching game at period t for k;p = 0;1, we can write
















denotes the expected equilibrium material payo⁄s of a kid. To-
gether with the parent￿ s evaluation of the kid￿ s expected non-economic bene￿t of co-
operating in matches of distance smaller than Y k
t it makes V
pk
t . If ￿p 6= ￿k, p and k
have di⁄erent values, and V
pk
t di⁄ers from the kid￿ s own evaluation. Tabellini (2008b,
p. 918) summarizes the intuition behind this element of the model as follows: ￿[P]arents
express a value judgment on their kids￿actions, and values are not randomly chosen to
suit one￿ s tastes. They re￿ ect deeply held convictions about religious or moral principles,
or beliefs about the long-run consequences of alternative patterns of behavior that likely
apply to everyone ... [V]alues are not the same thing as preferences. Parents are likely
to be convinced that what is ￿ right￿for themselves is also ￿ right￿for everyone else, and in
particular for their kids.￿
The fraction of trustworthy players in each period, nt, evolves endogenously over time
according to the following fundamental law of motion
nt = nt￿1 (￿ + ft) + (1 ￿ nt￿1)￿ = ￿ + nt￿1ft; (8)
where ft now exclusively denotes e⁄ort by a trustworthy parent. If parents exert no
e⁄ort, the average fraction of trustworthy kids in the population equals ￿. In period
t, the fraction of trustworthy parents nt￿1 exerts educational e⁄ort ft, which in turn
increases the fraction of trustworthy kids in the population by nt￿1ft on average. The
15parents￿optimal choice of educational e⁄ort implies ft > 0. Recalling ￿ + ft is denoting
a probability, it follows that 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ft. Furthermore, ft can be shown to be a known
functionft = F (Y 1
t ) that is strictly increasing in Y 1
t . This implies a second strategic com-
plementarity. If parents expect others to put more e⁄ort into education, they anticipate
that the fraction of trustworthy players will increase. They realize that this will expand
the scope of cooperation Y 1
t and increase educational e⁄ort. This central feature of the
model produces a certain inertia: A high starting level of trustworthiness in a society
(n0) can be sustained just as well as a low starting level for several generations. The
educational game behind is supermodular (Tabellini 2008b, pp. 921-922). To derive the
equilibrium and steady state, the equilibrium vector (Y 1￿
t ;n￿
t) is de￿ned to solve
Y
1
t = flnd ￿ ln[(w ￿ l)nt + l]g=￿
1 ￿ Y (nt) (9)













The ￿rst of these two equations de￿nes the maximum distance Y 1
t that sustains cooper-
ation by trustworthy players as a function of the fraction of other trustworthy players.
It is strictly increasing and convex in nt if l > w. The second equation de￿nes the law of
motion of the fraction of trustworthy players. As Y 1
t increases, trustworthy parents are
induced to put more e⁄ort into changing their kid￿ s values due to the second strategic
complementarity in the model. Hence, function nt = N (Y 1
t ;nt￿1) is also increasing in
Y 1
t . Thus, equilibrium (Y 1￿
t ;n￿
t) is a function of nt￿1. Setting nt = nt￿1 = ns, a steady
state is given by
Y
1￿







1 ￿ F (Y 1￿
s )
: (12)
We can derive the following central testable implications that we will elaborate in more
detail in the context of Germany￿ s reuni￿cation in the next subsection:
￿ Individuals are more willing to cooperate the higher is the probability that their
partner will also cooperate. The scope of cooperation Y 1
t is increasing in nt and
decreasing in (1 ￿ nt), that is, in the share of trustworthy and not-trustworthy in-
dividuals, respectively. This implies l > w, i.e., there is strategic complementarity.
16￿ If the ￿rst implication is found to hold, the equilibrium asymptotically reaches a
steady state (Y 1￿
t ;n￿
t).
￿ If the ￿rst two implications are found to hold, then both Y 1￿
t and n￿
t are time-
varying, and during the adjustment to the steady state move in the same direction.
The adjustment is not abrupt. There is inertia in n. It takes > 1 generation until
a new steady state is reached (second strategic complementarity).
3.3 Trust, scope of cooperation and German Reuni￿cation
Consider two societies, East (E) and West (W), that developed a scope of cooperation













. The respective steady states are depicted as the two
points of intersection in Figure 2. Obviously and intuitively, n￿W
t > n￿E
t , due to the above
discussed repressive nature of the GDR (denoted by superscript E), a police state, where
citizens were not only surveilled and scrutinized but also controlled by the underlings of
the regime recruited from fellow citizens. That is, the share of trustworthy persons in
W is higher than the one in society E. Next, consider fundamental equation (8) for a
consecutive sequence of periods (i.e., generations), where reuni￿cation happens to take
place in t, ￿ 2 (0;1), 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ f due to the fact that ￿ + f represents a probability, Ij for
j = W;E denotes inhabitants in East and West, and R denotes re-uni￿ed Eastern part
of Germany (Neue Bundesl￿nder):
t: nE
t = nE





￿ = ￿ + nE
t￿1ft
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t￿1, i.e., the share of trustworthy individuals in the former GDR has a
sustained impact on the share of trustworthy individuals even several generations after
reuni￿cation. However, this impact has a decaying weight due to f < 1. In the period of
reuni￿cation, the East German society moves out of its original steady state due to the
exogenous decrease in the overall fraction of not-trustworthy fellow citizens. This induces
a second round e⁄ect as East German parents now expect other East German parents to
put more e⁄ort into educating a trustworthy o⁄spring. They anticipate that due to this
e⁄ect the fraction of trustworthy players will further increase and they realize that this
will expand the scope of cooperation Y 1E
t . By increasing, both nE and Y 1E move in the







Figure 2. Trajectory of convergence into new equilibrium I
This is shown in Figure 2. Whether the transition to the new steady state is smooth or
perturbed, as suggested, for example, in S￿ssmuth et al. (2010), is unclear as indicated by
18the dashed line arrows. If we apply the model symmetrically to West German parents and
kids and follow the same argumentation as above with opposite signs, a self-reinforcing
downward spiral is triggered because of the second strategic complementarity. However,
as IW > IE, the downward movement of the West German steady state level towards a
steady state for the reuni￿ed society is less pronounced than the self-reinforced upward
tendency in the scope of cooperativeness and in the number of trustworthy individuals
of East Germans. The corresponding trajectory of convergence is shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Trajectory of convergence into new equilibrium II
4 Evidence
4.1 Data and empirical approach
Alike Alesina and Fuchs-Sch￿ndeln (2007), we use data from the German Socio-Economic
Panel (SOEP). The SOEP is a representative longitudinal database that was ￿rst admin-
istered in former West Germany in 1984 and was extended to East Germany in spring
1990, i.e. about half a year after the fall of the wall in 1989 and only a couple of months
before formal reuni￿cation in October 1990 (cf. Wagner et al. 2007). We are thus able
19(i) to identify individuals who lived in the former GDR before reuni￿cation and (ii) to
follow them over time. This last feature is a particular bene￿t since it allows examining
intra-individual changes in measures of trust, fairness, and cooperativeness as well as in
risk attitude.
In 2003 and 2008, the SOEP asked respondents about social trust as well as their
perceptions of others being fair or cooperative. Social trust is surveyed as responses to
￿What is your opinion on the following three statements?￿ , the items being: (A) ￿On the
whole one can trust people￿ , (B) ￿Nowadays one can￿ t rely on anyone￿ , and (C) ￿If one is
dealing with strangers, it is better to be careful before one can trust them.￿Responses are
given on a Likert-type ordinal 4-point scale, ranging from 1 ￿totally agree￿ to 4 ￿totally
disagree￿ . To ease interpretation, responses from the three items are each collapsed into a
binary indicator which takes on value one if the respondent is a trusting one, i.e. if he or
she totally agrees with the ￿rst statement, or in the case of (B) and (C) totally disagrees
with either of these two other statements. This might seem a loss of information, but
additional ordered probit estimations do not yield substantially di⁄erent results.5 There
are two further points to note with regard to these survey questions. First, item (B) is not
a static statement. It has some backward looking dimension as it requires respondents to
compare the situation today with the past. Secondly, item (C) asks about an assessment
of the trustworthiness of strangers. It is noteworthy that this group of strangers usually
refers not only to individuals who are not socially connected to the respondent but also
comprises foreign nationals.
Perceived fairness in the society is surveyed by ￿Do you believe that most people
...￿ (A) ￿would exploit you if they had the opportunity￿ or (B) ￿would attempt to be
fair towards you?￿ . Our ￿ again binary￿fairness variable equals one if the respondent
approves the latter statement.
Similarly, the binary ￿people are cooperative￿indicator is generated from the responses
to ￿Would you say that for most of the time, people ...￿ given by (A) ￿attempt to be
5Detailed results from ordered probit estimates are available on request from the authors
and will be made available in an accompanying online appendix.
20helpful?￿or (B) ￿only act in their own interests?￿ . Approving the ￿rst statement induces
value one in our variable.
Individuals￿risk attitudes were ￿rst measured in 2004, with a general risk attitude
item as well as context-speci￿c risk attitudes, such as risk-taking in ￿nancial matters, in
sports, or in health, and another risk measure derived from a hypothetical lottery sce-
nario. To be able to examine the development over time, we however use the general risk
attitude scale since it is only this indicator that is re-measured in 2008.6 The questions
in both waves of the survey read ￿Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to
take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks?;￿the scale of responses runs from 0 ￿risk
averse￿to 10 ￿fully prepared to take risks.￿We employ least squares estimation for this
variable as, again, results from ordered probit estimations are not substantially di⁄erent
from the ones we present below (see footnote 5).
In addition, we extend our analysis by looking at individuals￿attitudes towards in-
come redistribution. This exercise repeats and adds to the one by Rainer and Siedler
(2008). While they control for Easterners, their focus is on the impact of individuals￿
perceptions of occupational upward mobility on preferences for redistribution. We add
to their approach relaxing their age limit and thus employing a larger sample, as well as
including a larger set of controls out of which the dummy on whether an East German
respondent moved to West Germany after reuni￿cation deserves our interest. Since it
is plausible to assume that moving is caused by the better economic conditions in the
Western federal states,7 this coe¢ cient captures the learning process the respondent is
subject to: Adjusting his or her budget constraint by increasing income should thus alter
the perception of the ￿ fairness￿of the taxation scheme. To assess the attitude of SOEP
respondents towards progressive taxation, the following questions were asked: (A) ￿Is
the amount of taxes paid by an unskilled worker in Germany too much compared to other
6In their experimentally validated study of individual risk attitudes based on SOEP data,
Dohmen et al. (2005) document a substantial, and signi￿cant positive correlation between
measures of context-speci￿c and general risk attitude.
7In 2005, the unemployment rate in the former FRG was at 10.1% whereas it was at 18.3%
in the former GDR (Reinberg and Hummel 2007).
21groups, too little, or exactly appropriate?￿and (B) ￿And what do you think about the taxes
paid by a manager on the board of directors of a large company? Does he/she pay too
much, too little, or an exactly appropriate amount of taxes compared to other groups?￿ .
Again, we recoded (A) and (B) into an ordered gradient. Note that these items were
surveyed only once in 2005, so that we can get a cross-sectional picture only. However,
these cross-sectional estimates are intended to gleam a greater picture by complementing
the overall results from our longitudinal analyses.
Our baseline speci￿cations are linear probability models accounting for random e⁄ects
(RE-LPM) of the following form
yit = ￿ + x
0
it￿ + ￿EastGermani + ￿i + ￿it; (13)
where y = (trust j fairness j cooperativeness j risk), and x denotes covariates comprising
the socio-demographic characteristics sex, age (speci￿ed as a cubic function), educational
attainment, current employment status, employment history (yrs. of full-time/part-time
employment or unemployment), household income, marital status, number of children,
health status, and - in order to account for childhood and teenage circumstances - parental
education, parental religion, the size of the place the respondent lived at until the age of
15, and further whether he or she still lives in his or her childhood hometown. Moreover,
we capture intra-German variation by including the following contextual characteristics
at the federal state level: Gini coe¢ cient, unemployment rate, GDP p.c., rate of solved
crime cases, expenditure for education, and proportion of foreigners. A detailed summary
statistics of variables is given in Appendix B. Throughout all our estimates, LM tests
imply the rejection of the null: V ar(￿i) = 0, con￿rming our RE speci￿cation. Samples
that combine the waves of 2003 and 2008 (trust, fairness, cooperativeness) cover 31,707
observations for 19,998 persons. The number of observations for the sample that combines
the waves of 2004 and 2008 (risk) is 32,196 for 19,431 persons.
224.2 Findings and discussion
4.2.1 Trust items
Table 1 reports our RE-LPM estimates for the di⁄erent trust items as described in Sec-
tion 4.1. For all speci￿cations (1) to (6), we estimate a statistically signi￿cant negative
coe¢ cient for individuals who experienced the GDR system (East German), suggesting a
still existent relatively lower level of trust prevalent among this group of individuals. In
all even speci￿cations (2), (4), and (6), we also consider a potential e⁄ect from moving
to West Germany after reuni￿cation. We expect these respondents to show a relatively
higher level of trust compared to individuals who did not move to the West as it is plausi-
ble to assume that either trust fosters migration or migrating forces to trust. Apart from
the trust towards strangers,8 the estimates reported in Table 1 support this hypothesis.
Yet, in terms of size, an East-West gap remains and increases throughout, meaning that
the East-West di⁄erentials are even larger for those East Germans who did not migrate
after reuni￿cation.
The central coe¢ cient estimate to assess East-West convergence as described by the
model outlined in the preceding section is the interaction term of East German back-
ground and the ending year of our analysis 2008 (EGerman*08). As can be seen from
estimates of speci￿cation (2) to (6) in Table 1, there is convergence for the item cap-
turing the assessment of the overall trustworthiness of other people (Can trust people)
and perceived trustworthiness of strangers (Careful with strangers). In the case of the
former, the trust measure increases even if we di⁄erence out subjects who moved to the
West. All other things being equal, the estimates of speci￿cation (2) can be read in the
following way: Starting from an East German trust level of ￿0:065, every year, that is,
four times up to 2008, a term of +0:016=4 is added. According to this stylized calculation
of a convergence trajectory (cf. Alesina and Fuchs-Sch￿ndeln 2007), full convergence of
this trust item between East and West German individuals will be reached in one decade
8As noted earlier the statistical insigni￿cance of the ￿Moved West￿coe¢ cient in the assess-
ment of the trustworthiness of strangers might be the product of bias due to the fact that the
group of ￿strangers￿is not clearly de￿ned and, among others, also comprises foreign nationals.
23from now, that is, in 2020. This ￿nding is clearly in line with theoretical predictions
given in Section 3 and, in particular, also with the prediction of a possibly substantial
inertia in the passing of trust as a cultural value across generations. It is also this mea-
sure among the three analyzed trust items that comes the closest to the general notion of
trust underlying the model of Tabellini (2008b) and its application to the case of German
reuni￿cation outlined in Section 3.
Table 1. Basic Random E⁄ects LPM estimates: Trust items (dependent)
Can trust people Can￿ t rely on anyone Careful with strangers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
East German -0.030*** -0.065*** -0.034*** -0.063*** -0.039*** -0.050***
(0.008) (0.012) (0.010) (0.014) (0.011) (0.016)
Year 08 0.009 0.007 0.040*** 0.039*** -0.005 -0.005
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
EGerman*08 0.009 0.016*** -0.020*** -0.014* 0.026*** 0.029***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
Moved West ￿ 0.055*** ￿ 0.046*** ￿ 0.018
(0.012) (0.014) (0.016)
Controls + + + + + +
R2 0.017 0.018 0.031 0.031 0.020 0.020
Source: SOEP, 2003/08; N = 31,707
Note: ***, **, * denotes statistical signi￿cance at 1, 5, 10 percent level, respectively;
robust standard errors given in parentheses."Can￿ t rely on anyone" and "Careful
with strangers" are binary variables and recoded such that value 1 does not imply
distrust, but trust.
Estimated coe¢ cients of speci￿cations (5) and (6) imply that, other things being
equal, full convergence in perceived trustworthiness of strangers is reached by 2009, that
is, 20 years after reuni￿cation. Estimates of speci￿cations (3) and (4) show that only for
the intertemporal trust measure (Can￿ t rely on anyone) there is a profound and highly
signi￿cant upward tendency for East and West Germans as measured by the coe¢ cient
estimate of the Year 08 dummy. Combining estimated coe¢ cients, it becomes evident
that this upward trend is steeper for West Germans, implying again a persistent gap in
the attitude of East and West German individuals. It should be kept in mind however
that the statement that nowadays no one can be trusted is by far the most black-and-
24white attitude assessed by respondents. It represents the most strict (or radical) of the
considered measures.
In sum, regression results of our analysis of di⁄erent trust items con￿rm that indi-
viduals who experienced the GDR system still show a relatively higher level of social
distrust and scepticism. We also ￿nd that it is important to account for East-West
migration. Although pointing in the same direction, our estimates suggest to carefully
distinguish between di⁄erent dimensions of perceived trustworthiness: The persistence
of the East-West trust di⁄erential is the most pronounced for the intertemporal black-
and-white measure of trust, showing virtually no convergence. It is followed by the
overall trustworthiness of other people that will possibly converge some thirty years or
one generation after reuni￿cation. Finally, convergence in the perceived trustworthiness
of strangers is estimated to be reached in recent years, that is, less than one generation
after reuni￿cation. Regarding the con￿rmation of theoretical predictions, our estimates
employing the most general measure of trust as dependent variable con￿rm all testable
implications of the model outlined in Section 3.
4.2.2 Fairness, cooperativeness, risk attitude
Table 2 reports RE-LPM estimates employing as dependents our measures of perceived
fairness and cooperativeness as well as of individual risk attitude. As can be seen im-
mediately from the ￿rst line of coe¢ cient estimates in Table 2, East German individuals
report lower levels of perceived fairness and cooperativeness, but are relatively more in-
clined to take risks. Regarding relative size of coe¢ cients, this gap sustains even if we
control for moves to the West, which seem to play a statistically signi￿cant role only
in the case of cooperativeness. Accordingly, movers assess cooperativeness higher than
individuals who stayed in East Germany after the fall of the wall, though still lower than
West Germans.
25Table 2. Basic RE-LPM estimates: Fairness, cooperativeness, risk attitude
Fairness Cooperativeness Risk
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
East German -0.034** -0.036* -0.018 -0.063*** 0.290*** 0.362***
(0.016) (0.021) (0.015) (0.021) (0.072) (0.105)
Year 08 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.070*** 0.154* 0.142*
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.080) (0.080)
EGerman*08 0.001 0.002 -0.015 -0.006 -0.302*** -0.317***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.049) (0.052)
Moved West ￿ 0.001 ￿ 0.072** ￿ -0.114
(0.024) (0.023) (0.113)
Controls + + + + + +
R2 0.050 0.050 0.047 0.047 0.119 0.119
Source: SOEP, 2003/04/08; N = 31,707; 32,196
Note: ***, **, * denotes statistical signi￿cance at 1, 5, 10 percent level, respectively;
robust standard errors given in parentheses. "Fairness" and "Cooperativeness"
are binary variables representing whether the respondent perceives others to
act fair or to be helpful.
Another striking result is that we ￿nd no signi￿cant East-West convergence of either
perceived fairness or cooperativeness between 2003 and 2008, while risk attitudes fully
converged before the end of the second decade after reuni￿cation. The latter ￿nding
is straightforwardly explained by the learning process described in Section 2.2. In fact,
it is suggestive for a relatively short period of learning and adjustment to a more risk
averse attitude taking the time of about 1.5 to 2-times the length of an average business
cycle. But how can the ￿nding of no convergence in fairness and cooperativeness be
reconciled with our theoretical model in Section 3? The answer is a low elasticity with
which the upper bound of the scope of cooperation (Y 1) reacts to an increase of trust,
i.e. to an increase in the number of trustworthy individuals in the society. Figure 4
makes the point. As in Figure 2 and 3, the steeper of the two respectively intersecting
functions represents Y 1, while the ￿ atter one shows N (see equations 9 and 10). If
cooperativeness reacts only weakly to an increase in trust, Y 1 is fairly steep. As trust
increases, the initial (bold lines) East German steady state (E0) relocates as the number
of trustworthy individuals n increases exogenously after reuni￿cation. The shift along the
26ordinate is further ampli￿ed by the second strategic externality due to parents adjusting
values and passing them to their o⁄spring. A new steady state level of trust for reuni￿ed
Germany is reached (n￿
R).
Figure 4. Convergence in trust ￿(nearly) no convergence in cooperativeness
However, although there is a profound convergence along the ordinate, the e⁄ect on
cooperativeness is small given a low elasticity with which Y 1 reacts to an increase in n.
Technically, this elasticity is low when l and w are close in value (see Appendix A), that
is, when the loss from being cheated in the prisoner￿ s dilemma game is nearly the same
(or only slightly larger than) the bene￿t of cheating. Intuitively, this circumstance makes
it hard for individuals to discriminate between a matched partner playing fair and an
unfair partner. As a result, there is no unique steady state in the level of cooperativeness






as shown in Figure 4. This explains both
of our ￿ndings: persistence in the East-West fairness and cooperativeness gap and a
simultaneous convergence in trust.
4.2.3 Age e⁄ects, cohort e⁄ects, and regional variation
To analyze in more detail whether the duration of living in the repressive East German
system has left an imprint on our social and risk attitude measures for easterners, we
run additional regressions including terms that interact the East German background (i)
27with age and (ii) with cohort dummies. Results for these estimates are shown in Table 3
and Table 4.
Table 3. Further RE-LPM estimates: Age e⁄ects
Trust 1 Trust 2 Trust 3 Fairness Cooperate Risk
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
East German -0.064*** -0.080*** -0.074*** -0.056* -0.038 -0.025
(0.013) (0.017) (0.019) (0.029) (0.028) (0.135)
Year 08 0.007 0.039*** -0.005 0.072*** 0.069*** 0.138*
(0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.020) (0.019) (0.083)
EGerman*08 0.015*** -0.016** 0.027*** -0.002 -0.006 -0.349***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012) (0.052)
Age 0.001*** 0.0002 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.005*** -0.034***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.002)
EGerman*age 0.002 0.038 0.051* 0.052 -0.042 0.821***
(0.018) (0.023) (0.026) (0.041) (0.039) (0.186)
Controls + + + + + +
R2 0.016 0.031 0.020 0.048 0.046 0.118
Source: SOEP, 2003/04/08; N = 31,707; 32,196
Notes: ***, **, * denotes statistical signi￿cance at 1, 5, 10 percent level, respectively;
robust standard errors given in parentheses; Trust 1: "Can trust people",
Trust 2: "Can￿ t rely on anyone", Trust 3: "Careful with strangers"; the latter two
variables are recoded such that value 1 does not imply distrust, but trust;
"Fairness" and "Cooperativeness" are binary variables representing whether
the respondent perceives others to act fair or to be helpful.
Our ￿nding of a signi￿cant positive (and substantial in terms of size) interaction
term for age and cohort dummy, indicating that respondents spent at least part of their
adolescence behind the Iron Curtain, in the case of risk attraction is plausible. First,
it is noteworthy that overall we ￿nd younger individuals to be slightly more risk loving
than older ones (slope of age without interaction). Secondly, however, in the case of
easterners risk willingness profoundly increases with age, i.e. with time spent in the,
at least, economically less risky and widely without public deliberation of societal risk
environment of the GDR (cf. the estimated coe¢ cient of EGerman*age term in Table
3). This insight clearly reinforces our explanation of a learning process. Similarly, with
regard to cohort e⁄ects (Table 4), we ￿nd statistically signi￿cant and sizable risk love
28mark-ups for the top aged cohorts aged ￿ 65 years. This cohort also comprises individuals
that might have a free market experience from the time before division thwarting the
need to learn a risk averse attitude. However, it should be kept in mind that this group
of people is of negligible size as respondents who had experienced, for example, the
￿golden twenties￿as young adults would be in their late 90s in 2008. The corresponding
signi￿cant estimates for our measure of perceived cooperativeness con￿rm that freeing
a society￿ s captive minds is particularly hard for adults who spent their formative years
under communism. They suggest that only when the memory of totalitarian rule will
wash out, communism￿ s shadow will ￿nally be lifted and the scope of cooperation will
converge. In terms of our theoretical model, a long-term equilibrium lying right from Y
1￿
in Figure 4 will be reached.
Some regional variation at the federal state level in the East-West convergence of
social and risk attitude measures is reported in Table 5. This is of interest since there
has been disparity in di⁄erent spheres of life in the GDR, despite the system￿ s claim of
an equal standard of living in the whole country.9 Clearly, we do not and cannot argue
that the di⁄erences in conditions as given at around reuni￿cation would still persist in
2003/4 as transfer payments from West to East have been enormous (cf. Alesina and
Fuchs-Sch￿ndeln 2007), but it might still be possible that the learning process as outlined
in our model above will vary across the federal states.10 Our results imply that it is only
in the region of Brandenburg where measures of social trust converged to the level of
westerners. For individuals from Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, Saxony-Anhalt, and,
in particular, from Saxony we even ￿nd a signi￿cant diverging tendency. However, we
should interpret this result rather cautiously as there might be a substantial within-state
9While it, for example, was not illegal to watch West German TV, the citizens of a few areas
in the GDR simply could not do so since receiving other than the o¢ cial channels was technically
not possible. This occured in some north-eastern parts of Mecklenburg-West Pomeriana, but it
was particularly the area of and around the city of Dresden, i.e. in the eastern part of Saxony,
that was consequently known as ￿Valley of the Clueless￿ (￿Tal der Ahnungslosen￿ ). For a
recent study on the power of TV to shape personal values see Jensen and Oster (2009).
10We have run additional analyses using a subsample of East Germans who have never moved
away from their hometown (N=10,463). This group is obviously selective, but the patterns
found in the results are mainly coherent to the ones we present.
29heterogeneity of regional characteristics like urbanity as is the case for Saxony.
Table 4. Further RE-LPM estimates: Cohort e⁄ects
Trust 1 Trust 2 Trust 3 Fairness Cooperate Risk
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
East German -0.069*** -0.076*** -0.066*** -0.059** -0.059*** 0.199*
(0.012) (0.015) (0.017) (0.026) (0.025) (0.120)
Year 08 0.009 0.041*** -0.005 0.077*** 0.079*** 0.129
(0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.021) (0.020) (0.084)
EGerman*08 0.016*** -0.014* 0.029*** 0.003 -0.007 -0.311***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.052)
Born 1961-75 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.031 0.020 0.236***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.020) (0.019) (0.090)
Born 1946-60 0.008 0.007 -0.002 0.037 0.031 0.295**
(0.013) (0.016) (0.018) (0.028) (0.026) (0.127)
Born 1931-45 0.006 0.011 -0.009 0.022 0.067* 0.031
(0.016) (0.021) (0.023) (0.036) (0.035) (0.168)
Born 1930 o.e. 0.030 0.034 -0.003 0.084* 0.134*** -0.375*
(0.021) (0.026) (0.029) (0.046) (0.043) (0.211)
East*61-75 0.008 0.008 0.005 0.034* 0.0002 0.030
(0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.020) (0.019) (0.092)
East*46-60 0.006 0.022* 0.021 0.009 0.013 0.059
(0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.021) (0.020) (0.096)
East*31-45 0.003 0.017 0.026* 0.039* -0.009 0.358***
(0.010) (0.013) (0.014) (0.022) (0.021) (0.100)
East*30 o.e. 0.001 0.013 0.029 0.032 -0.057* 0.486***
(0.014) (0.017) (0.020) (0.031) (0.029) (0.142)
Controls + + + + + +
R2 0.018 0.032 0.021 0.050 0.048 0.120
Source: SOEP, 2003/04/08; N = 31,707; 32,196
Notes: ***, **, * denotes statistical signi￿cance at 1, 5, 10 percent level, respectively;
robust standard errors given in parentheses; Trust 1: "Can trust people",
Trust 2: "Can￿ t rely on anyone", Trust 3: "Careful with strangers"; the latter two
are recoded such that value 1 does not imply distrust, but trust.
"Fairness" and "Cooperativeness" are binary variables representing whether
the respondent perceives others to act fair or to be helpful.
30Table 5. Further RE-LPM estimates: Regional variation
Trust 1 Trust 2 Trust 3 Fairness Cooperate Risk
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EB -0.103*** -0.075*** -0.024 -0.052* -0.048 0.400***
(0.016) (0.020) (0.023) (0.034) (0.033) (0.162)
MVP -0.007 0.003 -0.030 0.016 -0.007 0.829***
(0.020) (0.025) (0.028) (0.043) (0.041) (0.204)
BB -0.083*** -0.097*** -0.084*** -0.065** -0.082*** 0.626***
(0.017) (0.021) (0.023) (0.036) (0.034) (0.179)
SXA 0.009 0.020 -0.069** 0.014 -0.033 0.462**
(0.021) (0.027) (0.030) (0.045) (0.043) (0.218)
TH 0.032 0.035 -0.019 -0.014 -0.054 0.406**
(0.020) (0.025) (0.028) (0.042) (0.041) (0.190)
SX -0.064*** -0.072*** -0.080*** -0.013 -0.039 0.623***
(0.014) (0.017) (0.020) (0.030) (0.029) (0.141)
Year 08 0.131*** 0.190*** 0.031 0.108** 0.187*** -0.112
(0.022) (0.028) (0.031) (0.046) (0.045) (0.194)
EB*08 0.023 0.001 -0.018 -0.016 -0.071* -0.491***
(0.020) (0.024) (0.027) (0.040) (0.039) (0.156)
MVP*08 -0.042** -0.047** -0.016 -0.032 -0.050 -0.418***
(0.017) (0.021) (0.024) (0.034) (0.033) (0.139)
BB*08 0.039*** -0.005 0.059*** 0.013 0.003 -0.460***
(0.013) (0.016) (0.018) (0.026) (0.026) (0.115)
SXA*08 -0.012 -0.049*** 0.022 -0.036 0.018 -0.262**
(0.013) (0.016) (0.018) (0.026) (0.026) (0.123)
TH*08 -0.007 -0.022 0.034** 0.053** 0.053** -0.117
(0.012) (0.015) (0.017) (0.024) (0.024) (0.105)
SX*08 -0.039*** -0.101*** 0.024 -0.027 -0.126*** -0.194*
(0.013) (0.017) (0.019) (0.028) (0.027) (0.117)
Controls + + + + + +
R2 0.019 0.033 0.021 0.050 0.048 0.119
Source: SOEP, 2003/04/08; N = 31,707; 32,196
Notes: ***, **, * denotes statistical signi￿cance at 1, 5, 10 percent level, respectively;
robust standard errors given in parentheses; EB: East Berlin, MVP: Mecklenburg-
West Pomerania, BB: Brandenburg, SX(A): Saxony(-Anhalt);
Trust 1: "Can trust people", Trust 2: "Can￿ t rely on anyone",
Trust 3: "Careful with strangers"; the latter two are recoded such that value 1
does not imply distrust, but trust. "Fairness" and "Cooperativeness" are binary
variables representing whether the respondent perceives others to act fair or
to be helpful.
314.2.4 Redistribution preferences and personality traits: 2005 cross-section
The results reported by Alesina and Fuchs-Sch￿ndeln (2007) and Rainer and Siedler
(2008) clearly indicate that East Germans are relatively more in favor of state interven-
tion in the form of income redistribution than their Western counterparts. We adapt the
approach of Rainer and Siedler (2008) and add to it addressing potential heterogeneity
among East Germans, i.e. we di⁄erentiate between Easterners who stayed in the former
GDR and those who moved west after the fall of the iron curtain. Table 6 reports our
cross-sectional estimates for attitudes towards progressive taxation and income redistri-
bution which is based on the two SOEP 2005 survey questions outlined at the end of
Section 4.1 above. Our ￿ndings corroborate the results of Rainer and Siedler (2008) inas-
much as our evidence also points to pro-working class redistribution preferences among
East Germans. We however additionally ￿nd a di⁄erence between movers and individuals
that did not move westwards, inasmuch as the latter are not in favor of such redistrib-
ution policies. Intuitively, this ￿nding is straightforward as individuals who move quite
likely do so because of promising economic expectations and possibly own prospects of
working one￿ s way up.
Table 6. SOEP 2005 cross-sectional estimates: Redistribution preferences
Taxes for unskilled workers Taxes for managers
Too little Adequate Too much Too little Adequate Too much
East German -0.004** -0.058* 0.062* 0.123*** -0.089*** -0.034***
(0.002) (0.030) (0.032) (0.026) (0.019) (0.007)
Moved West 0.005 0.060 -0.064 -0.144*** 0.091*** 0.053***
(0.004) (0.038) (0.042) (0.043) (0.024) (0.019)
Controls + + + + + +
Pseudo-R2 0.041 0.048
N 10,473 10,473
Notes: Ordered Probit estimation, marginal e⁄ects; ***, **, * denotes statistical
signi￿cance at 1, 5, 10 percent level, respectively;
robust standard errors given in parentheses.
We provide another complementing part of the overall picture in line with the ￿ndings
of Alesina and Fuchs-Sch￿ndeln (2007) who show that East Germans are more likely
32to believe that social conditions determine individual possibilities in life, but not the
individual his- or herself. We add to this employing a small set certain personality
traits that have an impact on socio-economic behavior and analyze whether these traits
di⁄er between East and West Germans. In particular, we employ SOEP information
on individuals￿external locus of control (Rotter 1966) as well indicator representing
individuals￿propensity to reciprocate positively or negatively. Locus of control refers
to the individual￿ s perception of the relation between his or her own behavior and its
consequences. Consequently, individuals with an external LOC are prone to believing
that chance or other factors beyond their control is the main determinant of the outcome
they experience. This ￿ts well into the context of trust since individuals with a high
external locus of control should be less willing to trust in order to avoid external, and
possibly negative impacts on their sphere of in￿ uence or behavior.
Reciprocity is a further measure on individual￿ s personality that is important in our
context. It means that ￿... in response to friendly actions, people are frequently much
nicer and much more cooperative than predicted by the self-interest model. Conversely,
in response to hostile actions they are frequently much more nasty and even brutal￿
(Fehr and G￿chter 2000, p. 159). This concept thus relates to individuals￿perceptions
of others acting fair and helpful, as examined above, and particularly how they would
react to either nice or hostile actions they experience.
The SOEP items we employ are again drawn from the 2005 wave only, so the following
cross-sectional analyses should be interpreted with all needed attention. Yet, there is evi-
dence that both reciprocity and external locus of control associate with relevant outcomes
such as wages or unemployment propensity; cf. Dohmen et al. (2009) for reciprocity and
Heineck and Anger (2010) for both reciprocity and external locus of control.
33Table 7. SOEP 2005 cross-sectional estimates: Locus of control and Reciprocity
Ext. LOC Ext. LOC Pos. Rec. Pos. Rec. Neg. Rec. Neg. Rec.
East German 0.062* 0.105* 0.031 0.079 -0.012 -0.024
(0.034) (0.055) (0.035) (0.056) (0.036) (0.056)
Moved West ￿ -0.069 ￿ -0.077 ￿ 0.019
(0.066) (0.067) (0.068)
Controls + + + + + +
Pseudo-R2 0.094 0.094 0.016 0.017 0.059 0.059
N 16,629 16,629 16,629 16,629 16,629 16,629
Notes: Ordered Probit estimation, marginal e⁄ects; ***, **, * denotes statistical
signi￿cance at 1, 5, 10 percent level, respectively; robust standard errors given
in parentheses. The variables external locus of control (Ext. LOC), positive and
negative reciprocity (Pos./Neg. Rec.) are standardized average values from the
respective underlying measures. The items underlying external locus of control
were identi￿ed in a ￿rst step using factor analysis.
The results of these additional exercises however are not as convincing as prior ex-
pectations might have induced. According to the ￿ndings provided in Table 7, East and
West do not di⁄er in their propensity to respond to other￿ s actions, irrespective of those
being positive or negative. In contrast, our estimates imply that East Germans have a
higher external locus of control. That is, compared to their West German counterparts,
East Germans, and particularly those who did not move west, are more likely believing
that external forces shape the circumstances they live in. Again, we believe that this
results ￿ts well to our baseline argument that the former East German Communist sys-
tem has left a long-lasting imprint on their citizens. Moreover, there is no hint towards
convergence of this gap. Given that the East German economic conditions are still worse
than the West German ones, one might argue and hope that these di⁄erentials will level
o⁄ once the economic framework will allow East Germans to be less dependent on state
provided transfers.
345 Conclusion
On November 9th 1989, when a bungled East German government announcement sent
a surge of people westwards, swamping the checkpoints in the wall, a new chapter in
German history began. From an applied economist￿ s perspective the event of Germany￿ s
reuni￿cation represents a unique natural experiment. For decades o¢ cial propaganda
in the GDR had lambasted the market-based economy and society of the FRG as akin
to cannibalism. The once omnipresent fear of denouncement and detainment seemingly
ceased over night. Against this background, we addressed the question whether and if
so by how much after 20 years of reuni￿cation restoration of social trust is completed,
fairness and cooperativeness restored, and attitudes towards risk converged. While we
￿nd that risk attitudes fully converged in the second decade of reuni￿cation, it will take
at least one generation for social trust and possibly much longer for perceived fairness
and cooperativeness to converge. The implied trajectories of our estimates are shown to
be in line with predictions from a model that incorporates individual responses both to
incentives and to values inherited from earlier generations as recently suggested in the
literature.
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1. To show that @Y 1
@n > 0, and Y 1 increases in n until Y 1 ￿ Y 0
holds, is equivalent to show that
@e y1
@n > 0. Re-write equation (5) in the text
e y
1 = flnd ￿ ln[￿n + l]g￿
￿1;







Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Can trust people 0.055 (0.228) ￿
Can￿ t rely on anyone 0.091 (0.288) ￿
Careful with strangers 0.117 (0.321) ￿
Fairness 0.515 (0.499) ￿
Cooperativeness 0.358 (0.479) ￿
Risk willingness ￿ 4.376 (2.327)
R is East German 0.303 (0.459) 0.302 (0.459)
Interview in 2008 0.437 (0.496) 0.445 (0.497)
Age 48.288 (17.503) 48.609 (17.601)
R is male 0.480 (0.499) 0.478 (0.499)
R is migrant 0.128 (0.334) 0.129 (0.335)
R is disabled 0.125 (0.331) 0.128 (0.334)
R is married 0.593 (0.491) 0.589 (0.491)
R is married, but separated 0.017 (0.131) 0.016 (0.128)
R is divorced 0.082 (0.275) 0.084 (0.278)
R is widowed 0.068 (0.253) 0.070 (0.256)
Education: missing 0.068 (0.251) 0.069 (0.255)
Education: no quali￿cation 0.040 (0.197) 0.040 (0.196)
Education: intermediate sec. 0.352 (0.477) 0.351 (0.477)
Education: upper secondary 0.173 (0.379) 0.174 (0.379)
R has no vocational qualif. 0.238 (0.426) 0.237 (0.425)
R has university degree 0.097 (0.296) 0.098 (0.298)
Number of children 0.498 (0.869) 0.490 (0.868)
Log of net HH income 7.702 (0.540) 7.702 (0.542)
R is unemployed 0.070 (0.255) 0.071 (0.257)
R is retired 0.234 (0.423) 0.234 (0.423)
R is on maternity leave 0.022 (0.147) 0.022 (0.147)
R is out of labor force 0.132 (0.338) 0.136 (0.343)
R is in dual apprenticeship 0.024 (0.154) 0.024 (0.153)
R is civil servant 0.037 (0.189) 0.036 (0.187)
R is white collar worker 0.284 (0.451) 0.280 (0.449)
R is temporary employed 0.067 (0.250) 0.068 (0.251)
R has public employer 0.059 (0.235) 0.059 (0.236)
LM experience: full-time (yrs.) 17.442 (14.097) 17.530 (14.141)
LM experience: part-time (yrs.) 2.609 (5.621) 2.671 (5.674)
LM experience: unemploymt. (yrs.) 0.843 (2.045) 0.870 (2.071)
Father￿ s education: missing 0.096 (0.294) 0.096 (0.295)
Father￿ s education: other 0.029 (0.170) 0.029 (0.169)
Father￿ s education: none 0.031 (0.173) 0.031 (0.174)
(continued on next page)
36Father￿ s education: middle sec. 0.135 (0.341) 0.135 (0.342)
Father￿ s education: interm. sec. 0.007 (0.088) 0.007 (0.088)
Father￿ s education: upper sec. 0.090 (0.286) 0.091 (0.288)
Mother￿ s education: missing 0.084 (0.278) 0.085 (0.279)
Mother￿ s education: other 0.023 (0.152) 0.023 (0.152)
Mother￿ s education: none 0.037 (0.190) 0.037 (0.190)
Mother￿ s education: middle sec. 0.166 (0.372) 0.168 (0.374)
Mother￿ s education: interm. sec. 0.005 (0.074) 0.005 (0.076)
Mother￿ s education: upper sec. 0.044 (0.206) 0.045 (0.208)
Father has university degree 0.105 (0.306) 0.104 (0.306)
Mother has university degree 0.054 (0.227) 0.055 (0.228)
Father￿ s religion: missing 0.455 (0.498) 0.455 (0.498)
Father￿ s religion: none 0.095 (0.293) 0.096 (0.295)
Father￿ s religion: Protestant 0.237 (0.425) 0.236 (0.425)
Father￿ s religion: other religion 0.027 (0.164) 0.027 (0.163)
Mother￿ s religion: missing 0.464 (0.498) 0.465 (0.498)
Mother￿ s religion: none 0.081 (0.273) 0.081 (0.274)
Mother￿ s religion: Protestant 0.245 (0.430) 0.244 (0.429)
Mother￿ s religion: other religion 0.026 (0.160) 0.026 (0.160)
Place raised to age 15: missing 0.045 (0.207) 0.044 (0.205)
Place raised to age 15: large city 0.209 (0.407) 0.209 (0.407)
Place raised to age 15: medium city 0.168 (0.374) 0.167 (0.373)
Place raised to age 15: small city 0.206 (0.405) 0.208 (0.406)
Still lives in town where raised 0.526 (0.499) 0.527 (0.499)
Regional Gini coe¢ cient 0.276 (0.014) 0.277 (0.014)
Regional UE rate 10.127 (4.535) 10.123 (4.510)
Regional crime-solving rate 55.235 (5.818) 55.967 (5.991)
Regional GDP p.c. 111.292 (8.287) 112.701 (7.295)
Regional expenditure for education 3.378 (0.664) 3.322 (0.638)
Regional proportion of foreigners 8.112 (3.821) 8.088 (3.798)
N 31,707 32,196
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